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TRADE AGREEMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SOVEREIGNTY: CASE STUDIES FROM
CANADA
J. Owen Saunders*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Attitudes towards free trade, whether in the context of
1
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or the North
2 typically reflect both conAmerican Free Trade Agreement,
cerns over threats to vulnerable domestic industries and the
attraction of expanded export markets. It is the tension between these two forces that generates the ultimate compromise of trade policy. Similarly, with respect to environmental
policy, the possibility of international agreements and international sanctions raise both the prospect of benefitting from
wider application of internationally beneficial environmental
standards and the spectre that domestic autonomy in environmental policy will be eroded. Given that modern international trade agreements such as NAFTA and, to a lesser ex3
tent, the Uruguay Round of GATT, inevitably carry with
them important environmental implications, it is not surprising that these agreements have attracted the attention of the
environmental community. It is probably inevitable that
those environmentalists concerned with restrictions on domestic environmental autonomy should find common interests with those voices representing industries threatened by
competition from imports. The challenge in such situations is
often to distinguish between what is a legitimate environmental measure and what is protectionism in green clothing.
* Executive Director, Canadian Institute of Resources Law, and *Adjunct
Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada
T2N 1N4.

1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 (1947).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992, Can.Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1 (1994).
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This paper examines the tensions between international
disciplines and national autonomy in the context of two issues that have been highly visible in Canada. These issues
are the exploitation of Canada's forests, and the possibility of
large-scale exports of Canada's fresh water. This paper considers each of these issues in turn. First, however, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of Canadian perspectives on
free trade, with special reference to the natural resources
sector.
II. BACKGROUND

In analyzing Canadian perspectives on the relationship
between international trade agreements and environmental
sovereignty, it is crucial to have an understanding of the historical context of Canadian policies on natural resource exploitation, since in many respects, issues of natural resource
management drive Canadian environmental policy-and certainly more so than in the United States. For most of Canada's history as a distinct country there has existed as an important part of its culture a stream of nationalist sentiment
which has had as one of its central foci the role of natural
resources in economic development. This sentiment has been
reflected from time to time in governmental measures directed at encouraging the further processing of these resources in an attempt to capture what would be referred to
today as "forward linkages." The underlying fear that has
spawned such measures is that Canada will serve merelyand to its detriment-as a "hewer of wood and drawer of
water" for the countries that have dominated its trade relations, which, roughly speaking, are the United Kingdom
before World War II and the United States since the War. In
this respect, many Californians will detect a current that is
not dissimilar to forces historically at play in Mexican political culture and which have been extremely influential in
Mexico-U.S. relations, particularly in the energy sector.4
The influence of this nationalist stream of thought has
ebbed and flowed over the years, but was in full flood from the
mid-1960s until the early 1980s under a series of liberal gov4. For a discussion of the similarity between Canadian and Mexican political experience in this respect, see J. Owen Saunders, The Mexico Factor in
North American Free Trade:A CanadianPerspective, 9(4) J.E.R.L. 239, 240-48
(1991).
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ernments in Ottawa, reaching its highwater mark in the National Energy Program of 1980. 5 Interestingly, and not surprisingly given the nature of oil price increases in the 1970s,
this period was also characterized by a similarly intense period of what might be called "resource nationalism" in Mexico.6 Like Canada, Mexico introduced its own National Energy Program in 1980, albeit the concerns addressed in that7
policy were different from those which motivated Canada.
Indeed, the similarities in nationalist sentiment between
Mexico and Canada over this period go beyond the energy
sector to embrace a reevaluation of the general benefits of foreign investment.' In both cases, while the resulting laws and
policies were generally directed at foreign investment, as a
political reality, the driving force for these measures was specific concern with United States investment and economic
hegemony.
5. Energy, Mines and Resources Canada. The National Energy Program
(1980). The Program was implemented by means of a number of federal acts.
At the heart of the Program was the goal of achieving energy self-sufficiency for
Canada, especially with respect to petroleum resources. This goal was combined with a policy of increasing the degree of Canadian ownership and control
over the oil and gas sector, as well as a two-tier price system to soften the transition to higher world energy prices for Canadians. Because the Program was
built on the assumption of continued and rapid increases in oil prices, such as
those that characterized the 1970s, much of it was in effect rendered obsolete
even by the early 1980s. The other key aspects of the Program were effectively
gutted with the election of the Progressive Conservative government of Brian
Mulroney in 1984.
6. Although in the case of Mexico the antecedents in the petroleum sector
go back much further, to the nationalizations of the 1930s, and, for obvious historical reasons that need not be rehearsed here, they evoke much stronger feelings than has been true in Canada.
7. Mexico did not have the same concerns with respect to foreign control of
its energy sector as did Canada. However, Mexico was interested in diversification of its energy markets to avoid undue dependence on United States customers. For a discussion of the Mexican National Energy Program, see G. Sz6kely,
Dilemmas of Export Diversification in a Developing Economy: Mexican Oil in
the 1980s, 17(11) WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1777, 1780-82 (1989).
8. Thus, for example, one of the landmark steps in Canadian thinking during this period was a 1972 government-initiated report on foreign investment,
known as the "Gray Report" after its chairman. H.E. Gray (Chairman), FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA (1972). This was followed shortly by federal legislation that provided for both restrictions on and review of foreign direct investment in Canada. Foreign Investment Review Act, S.C. 1973-74, c.46,
as amended. One of the most significant pieces of Mexican legislation restricting such investment is of the same vintage, that is the 1973 Law to Promote
Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment, which reserved to either
the Mexican government or Mexican nationals large sectors of the Mexican
economy, especially with respect to natural resources.
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The 1980s saw a retreat from the nationalist agenda in
Canada, and in Mexico as well. In Canada, this retreat began
even before the 1984 election of the Conservative government, but accelerated appreciably after that.9 The culmination of the Mulroney government's efforts to open up the Canadian economy, especially vis-A-vis the United States, was
of course the conclusion of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, 10 despite the fact that the FTA had not even been
mentioned as a Conservative Party objective in the 1984 election campaign.
Whether or not Canada should ratify the FTA became
the central issue of the federal election campaign of 1988.
Later, to a lesser extent, the alleged defects in NAFTA similarly became an issue in the federal election of 1993. The opposition to FTA was especially stiff and engaged a coalition
comprised of groups such as labor unions, environmentalists,
and nationalists, with some significant overlap among these
constituencies. Although many issues were raised in the
course of these debates, some of which will be more familiar
to Americans in the context of NAFTA, none was more important than the implications of the Agreements on Canada's
ability to manage its natural resources endowment-an issue
that raised questions of fundamental importance with respect
to environmental policy.
However, the Canadian approach to sovereignty and environmental policy was in many respects a schizophrenic one.
On the one hand, there was a concern that free trade would
lead to Canada losing control of its environmental policy,
with the result that it would be forced to accept as the "lowest
common denominator" the standards of those governments

9. The new openness to international economic influences was reflected
most immediately in the repeal of investment review legislation and the replacement with legislation that had as its primary focus the encouragement of
foreign investment in Canada. Apart from its new approach to foreign investment, the incoming federal government also acted to effectively reverse many of
the nationalist elements in Canada's energy policy by deregulating prices and
limiting the National Energy Board's regulatory role over natural gas exports.
10. Can.-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA), Dec. 10, 1987 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1989) (Implemented in Canada by the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. ch. 65 (1988), and in the United
States by the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation
Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-449, 102 Stat. 26 (1988)).
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willing to accept pollution as the price of investment.1 1 On
the other hand, there was a concern that other countries, especially the United States, might use inappropriately stiff environmental standards as a justification for engaging in protectionism of weak resource sectors. The discussion below
provides two examples of such Canadian concerns. The longrunning dispute with respect to Canadian exports of softwood
lumber illustrates concern over the application of allegedly
"inappropriate" United States natural resource management
practices to justify protectionist measures against Canadian
exports. The debate over possible water exports illustrates
Canadian fears that international trade rules in FTA and
NAFTA will act to constrain Canadian domestic autonomy in
natural resources and environmental management.
III.

SOFTWOOD LUMBER

Canadian concerns with natural resources protectionism
in the United States grew out of a series of trade disputes in
the 1980s. The case of softwood lumber is of special interest
because disputes concerning Canadian lumber practices were
a significant point of contention between Canada and the
United States in the period leading up to the conclusion of the
FTA. 12 Moreover, the central dispute concerned what most
environmentalists would consider today to be an issue of environmental management, although it was not phrased in
those terms at the time.
The softwood lumber dispute was one of a series of actions by United States trade tribunals that reflected what
was generally perceived by Canada (and other trade partners) as a growing mood of protectionism on the part of the
11. This is a concern that is well-known in the United States and was the

subject of much attention in the NAFTA debate. In the United States, however,
the perceived potential polluter that threatened environmental standards was
Mexico. In Canada, this threat in the context of the FTA was seen-rightly or
wrongly-to stem from the United States, and particularly from southern

states eager to attract investment.
12. Two disputes in particular attained national visibility in Canada. The
first, and more serious, concerned a countervail action against Canadian softwood lumber. The second involved an "emergency" action against Canadian
cedar shakes and shingles. In the interest of brevity, and because, strictly
speaking, emergency actions do not go to the issue of "fair trade" practices, this

article will deal only with the former. Both FTA and NAFTA, however, contain
significant provisions designed to reduce the incidence and scope of emergency
actions.
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United States in the 1980s. 13 This protectionist trend found
expression in both Congress and in the tribunals charged
with administering United States trade law. More particularly with respect to natural resources, the trend reflected
concerns on the part of United States resource producers that
they were the victims of "unfair" competition by foreign competitors, including Canada.
In 1985, in the face of growing domestic political discontent with the administration of United States countervail
law, the United States Court of International Trade [hereinafter "CIT"] changed course with respect to an important element of its test of what constitutes a countervailable subsidy.
One of the basic questions in determining whether there has
been improper subsidization of an imported good is whether
that subsidy is specifically bestowed on an industry. It is accepted under international trade law that generally available
subsidies which are not targeted at specific industries should
not be the subject of countervailing duties. 14 There is, however, a distinction between subsidies that are generally available in theory and those which are generally available in
practice. Until the mid-1980s, the practice of the United
States International Trade Administration [hereinafter
"ITA"] was to focus on whether, as a matter of law, subsidies
were generally available, rather than asking whether in practice some industries received greater benefits from the subsidy than did others. This approach to specific endowment of
subsidies was effectively rejected by the CIT in a 1985 case
dealing with the consequences of Mexico's two-tier system of
natural gas pricing, 15 a system that had striking parallels in
the two-tier approach which had at one time operated in Can13. For a discussion of the history of natural resources protectionism in the
United States, see Christian Yoder, United States CountervailingDuty Law and
CanadianNatural Resources: The Evolution of Resources Protectionism in the
United States, in TRADING CANADA'S NATURAL RESOURCES 81 (J. Owen Saunders, ed., 1987).
14. For example, Canada's national health care system clearly acts as a
subsidy for employers in Canada, and indeed is often cited as giving them a
measure of competitive advantage over United States competitors. It is not,
however, a subsidy that would be actionable under international trade law
since it is not bestowed on a particular industry. By comparison, if the health
care system was restricted to workers in the mining sector, this would arguably
constitute a benefit specifically bestowed on that industry, and, as such, be open
to attack through countervailing duties.
15. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (1985).
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ada. This paper will not discuss that decision in detail. The
relevant point for this paper is that the change in approach
had important implications in Canada with respect to the forest industry.
In 1983, in response to a petition against the Canadian
softwood lumber industry by United States producers, the
ITA determined that certain provincial forest management
practices, most importantly the stumpage fees charged to the
forest industry from Crown timber, amounted to subsidization.16 However, the ITA had also decided that not only were
the amounts involved not significant, but there was no specific bestowal of the benefits on a particular industry. Moreover, even in the event of specific bestowal, there was no
preferentiality exhibited by the practices.
In light of the 1985 decision on Mexican natural gas, another petition was brought against Canadian softwood lumber producers in 1986 on essentially the same facts as the
1983 petition. In October of that year, the ITA, following the
reasoning of the Mexican gas decision, issued a preliminary
ruling in which it effectively reversed its 1983 decision as to
both bestowal and preferentiality.' 7 Before a final decision
(scheduled for December 1986) was issued, Canada and the
United States reached an agreement under which Canada
imposed an export tax of fifteen percent, which was eventually rescinded, in place of 8the threatened countervailing duties by the United States.'
The agreement between the two governments was criticized, for quite different reasons, on both sides of the border.
In some quarters in Canada it was seen as a capitulation to
United States protectionism; in other quarters it was offered
as further evidence of the need for a dispute resolution mechanism that would protect Canada against such perceived
19
abuses of United States trade law in the future. To the ex16. Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Softwood
Lumber Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (1983).
17. Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Certain
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (1986).
18. Canada-United States Memorandum of Understanding on Softwood
Lumber, Dec. 30, 1986. The understanding is grandfathered in the FTA in Article 2009. FTA, supra note 10, at art. 2009.
19. This is especially the case since the approach taken by the Court of International Trade ultimately found its way into the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
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tent that it gave greater impetus to a Canada-U.S. free trade
arrangement, then, the case is of some importance. Less
often remarked upon, however, is another aspect of the
case-the extent to which it may be seen as one of the first
cases in the Canada-U.S. trade relationship that concerned
essentially environmental, in the broad sense of the word,
issues.
As noted, the Canadian government eventually rescinded
the agreement to impose an export tax on the basis that Canadian resource management practices were in conformity
with international trade law and did not operate to confer a
subsidy (which rescission led to tribunal hearings under the
FTA/NAFTA dispute resolution mechanism). The underlying
disagreement as to what does and does not constitute a subsidy, however, was left unaddressed. This issue was of primary concern for Canadian negotiators in the FTA negotiations. However, the FTA ultimately delivered only a
commitment to negotiate a common set of trade rules that
would presumably eliminate such disputes in the future.2" In
this respect, the commitment in NAFTA is even weaker, 2 '
leaving open the question whether, for example, resource
management practices which would be considered environmentally "unsound" in the United States are open to countervail on the basis that they constitute a subsidy. While the
Subsidies Code of GATT provides some assistance in this respect, as do the provisions on sanitary and phytosanitary
measures in both NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, it is by no means comprehensive in the problems it
addresses.
20. Article 1906 of the FTA essentially provides a period of seven years,
consisting of an initial five-year period and a two-year extension, for the parties
to negotiate a common set of rules. FTA, supra note 10, art. 1906. Meanwhile,
pursuant to Article 1902, parties are committed to not change their trade rules
in a way that is inconsistent with "the object and purpose of [the] Agreement."
FTA, supra note 10, at art. 1902. The author has argued elsewhere, that
although agreement on a common set of trade rules was a high priority for Canada in the FTA negotiations, the ultimate provision is of questionable value
given the limited recourse available to Canada (i.e. repudiation of the entire
Agreement) in the event of failure to agree on such rules. J. Owen Saunders,
Energy, Natural Resources and the Canada-UnitedStates Free Trade Agreement, J.E.R.L. 1 (1990).
21. In NAFTA there is merely an agreement to "consult" on the "potential"
development of more effective trade rules. NAFTA, supra note 2, at art.
1907(2).
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A final practical question alluded to above should be addressed. That is, how successful was the application of trade
sanctions from an environmental perspective in the softwood
lumber case? Two observations should be made in this regard. The first is that judged on the basis of its political effectiveness as a measure to challenge Canadian forestry practices, it is at least arguable that the countervail action in the
United States had a perverse result. Because the action was
perceived in Canada as naked protectionism, it generated
considerable support among the public for the forest industry
under attack. Indeed, the very question of whether Canadian
stumpage fees were inappropriately low became almost entirely lost in the domestic debate. In this respect, then, the
case acted in some measure to disarm the Canadian environmental constituency that had been raising serious concerns
as to the terms on which provincial governments disposed of
Crown timber.
As a second observation, international action at the
grassroots consumer level is a much more effective example
of challenging the environmental soundness of Canadian forest practices and as been generally perceived in Canada as
predicated on genuine environmental concerns, however
much one might agree or disagree with those concerns, rather
than protectionist motives. Moreover, it is clear that such actions have had real effects, especially at the political level, in
changing attitudes to forest management in Canada.
In summary, the dispute over softwood lumber suggests
that the possibility of so-called "green protectionism" cannot
be dismissed. Although the issues in this dispute have not
been framed in environmental terms, and although environmental groups were not involved in bringing the trade actions
in question, the arguments with respect to the "proper" prices
for disposal of natural resources obviously touch on much
broader issues of resource conservation and use, which extend beyond the forest sector. While the FTA/NAFTA dispute
resolution mechanism has proved useful in resolving this dispute for Canada-United States timber interests have been
far less satisfied-the underlying problems of what are acceptable environmental practices and what are unacceptable
subsidies, as well as the question of whose standards should
apply in determining environmental acceptability, have not
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been resolved. The questions will inevitably arise again in
other contexts.
The dispute also suggests a possible downside to environmentalists forming common cause with industry groups pursuing normal self-interest. By playing the trade card in concert with such groups, there is a real danger that the
environmental dimensions of the problem will be lost in the
inevitable backlash against protectionism. If one of the
longer-term objectives of environmental groups is to educate
the public and develop broad support for an environmental
ethos, it is not clear that alliances of temporary convenience
will always prove useful.
IV.

WATER EXPORTS

If softwood lumber provides an example of Canadian fear
of United States resource protectionism, and, by implication,
of having Canada's exports hindered by the imposition of foreign-and inappropriate-environmental standards, then
the issue of water exports illustrates the other side of the
coin, that is, the fear that Canada itself will be rendered incapable of applying its own environmental standards to prevent
the export of its natural resources. The issue of water exports
is one which goes back over three decades in Canada, and has
never failed to generate strong feelings. It has been pointed
out that Canadians, perhaps not uniquely, have different reactions to the sale of water than they do to the sale of other
natural resources. For example, a recent inquiry on federal
water policy noted the role of water in Canada's own vision of
itself. Stated briefly: "Canadians ... tend to identify them-

selves as a land laced with water,"22 an identification which
pervades Canadian cultural images. Not surprisingly then,
the possibility of engaging in long-term massive exports of
water is one that inevitably touched a nationalist chord in
Canada. The most recent example of this current of nationalist feeling is found in the debate over the FTA, although the
same arguments were replayed in a more muted version during the debate over NAFTA.
To understand Canadian concerns with respect to water
exports, it should be recalled that beginning in the 1960s, and
22. Canada, Inquiry on Federal Water Policy, FINAL REPORT:
CHANGE 7 (1985).

CURRENTS OF
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reemerging from time to time over the years, there have been
a number of massive water export proposals focused on turning northern Canadian rivers southward to service what was
typically viewed as a thirsty American market that would ultimately require such resources as the price of economic expansion, particularly in the rapidly growing, but arid,
southwest.
To indicate the scope of these projects, one need only note
the two that received the greatest attention: the NAWAPA
proposal and the GRAND Canal. Under the former, rivers in
the Canadian northwest, now flowing into the Arctic Ocean,
would be reversed and channelled southwards into the southwestern United States by means of flooding the Rocky Mountain trench. Under the latter, James Bay would be diked and
turned over time into a giant freshwater reservoir to collect
and "recycle" otherwise "wasted" water from northern Quebec
Rivers, with the waters shipped southwards through a series
of canals and existing river systems in the Great Lakes and
Mississippi system. It might be noted that this proposal also
anticipated the use of large nuclear pumping stations to this
end.
While these schemes might seem so environmentally objectionable (if not outrageous) that they could never be taken
seriously, a number of factors gave such proposals heightened
attention during the FTA debate. First, in the period leading
up to the FTA negotiations, there was a revived interest in
the GRAND Canal scheme. Indeed, at one point in an interview with FORTUNE magazine, Prime Minister Mulroney remarked in passing on the possible merits of such a project.
Perhaps even more important, the chief Canadian negotiator
for the FTA, before his appointment to the position, acted as a
lobbyist for the GRAND Canal consortium and had written
favorably on how Canada might use the attraction of water
exports to negotiate a free trade arrangement with the
United States. Another factor which gave the water export
controversy special relevance in the context of the debate
over the FTA was the coincidental emergence of a drought in
1988 in the Mississippi basin amid warnings that this was
more generally indicative of a trend towards global warming
and climate change. It was during this same period that
there were proposals, which were ultimately rejected, to increase the allowed size of the Chicago diversion into the Mis-
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sissippi system, a diversion which could be characterized in
Canada as an indirect-and involuntary-form of water
export.23
There were several aspects to the debate over the implications of FTA, and subsequently NAFTA, for Canada's ability to manage its water resources. 24 The most basic question
was whether water in its "natural" state, that is, water that
had not been "captured" in bottles or tankers, 25 was even included as a good under the FTA. It was the position of the
Canadian government that water was not so included, while
opponents to the Agreement insisted that the FTA was, at
best, unclear in this respect and therefore should be amended
accordingly. Assuming there was indeed room for an interpretation that included all fresh water within the purview of
the Agreement, this would also hold true with respect to Canada's obligations under GATT. In the case of GATT, however,
there were instruments available to effectively prevent such
exports-for example, the possibility of prohibitive export
taxes, which would be allowed under the GATT, but which
are prohibited under FTA and under NAFTA.26
23. The Chicago diversion dates to 1848, although the size of the diversion
has varied. It became a significant flow in 1900 with the completion of the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal. The diversion draws water from Lake Michigan,
and certain waters that would otherwise have flowed into the lake are diverted
southwards. Although Lake Michigan lies wholly within the United States, a
change in the lake's level would ultimately have an effect on all the Great
Lakes.
24. For a full discussion of the trade implications of both the GATT and the
FTA for Canadian water exports, see CANADIAN WATER EXPORTS AND FREE
TRADE, Rawson Academy Occasional Paper No. 2 (A.L.C. de Mestral & D.M.
Leith eds., Dec. 1989).
25. While it was generally conceded by all sides that bottled water or
tanker exports of water came within the ambit of FTA and NAFTA, there is
nevertheless room for doubt as to the restraints on provincial governments in
their regulation of such exports as the result of the passage of FTA and NAFTA.
For a discussion of the legal issues surrounding tanker exports which, for example, have been proposed between British Columbia and California in recent
years see J. Owen Saunders, Tanker Sales with the Support of a Province, in
CANADIAN WATER EXPORTS AND FREE TRADE, supra note 24, at 59.
26. Other issues in the debate included the possible application of the nullification and impairment provisions of the FTA, the proper interpretation of the
national treatment clause with respect to water exports, and the scope of the
"environmental" exceptions in GATT (which are also incorporated into FTA and
NAFTA). A debate on these and other points between proponents and opponents of the Agreement is found in CANADIAN WATER EXPORTS AND FREE TRADE,
supra note 24.
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Even following the reelection of the Mulroney government in 1988 and the subsequent implementation of FTA, its
possible threat to Canadian sovereignty over water exports
continued to fester, and reemerged as an issue in the debate
over NAFTA. One of the campaign planks of the opposition
Liberals in the federal election campaign of 1993 was a commitment to achieve certain changes in NAFTA as a precondition to its implementation. One of the changes demanded
was an alteration in NAFTA to make it clear that water in its
natural state would not be subject to the provisions of
NAFTA. Upon their election in the fall of 1993, the victorious
Liberal Party made what many believed were token gestures
in the direction of "improving" or "clarifying" NAFTA,
although there was no change in the Agreement itself. One
result was the issuance of a number of joint statements by
the NAFTA parties, which were used by the new Canadian
government as evidence that it had indeed met its election
commitments. The statements included a joint statement "in
order to correct false interpretations" that "[t]he NAFTA creates no rights to the natural water resources of any Party to
the Agreement."2 7 The statement is perhaps somewhat ironic
since presumably the primary source of the "false interpretations" had been the Liberal Party itself, which had argued,
beginning in 1988, that FTA and NAFTA were indeed open to
this very reading.
One could construct arguments that even the joint declaration does not definitively close the case on water exports.
However, this seems somewhat of a barren exercise, especially given the highly remote possibility that such megaprojects as NAWAPA or the GRAND Canal will be undertaken, if only because of economic realities-let alone because of their environmental implications.
The debate over water exports points out the degree of
suspicion with which many environmental groups view international trade agreements. Although the example is in many
ways a uniquely Canadian one in its specifics, it is clear from
the debate in the United States over both NAFTA and the
Uruguay Round of GATT that the qualms it reflects are more
general. Perhaps less obviously than the softwood lumber
dispute, however, it also illustrates how environmental isUnited
27. Statement by the Governments of Canada, Mexico and the
1993.
1,
Dec.
States,
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sues, once raised, tend to be given shorter shrift than other
more parochial concerns. One reaction to the debate over
water exports and the FTA, for example, was legislation at a
provincial level designed to deal with the possible inequities
of engaging in environmentally-disastrous transboundary diversions for export. For example, Ontario's Water Transfer
Control Act, 1989 requires approval of the Minister of Natural Resources for the transfer of water out of any provincial
drainage basin. However, transfers of water to "a place
outside of Canada" are absolutely prohibited. 28 Presumably,
if interbasin transfers are environmentally inappropriate, it
should make no difference whether the transfer is within or
outside Canada; from an environmental perspective both are
equally bad. Indeed, the Act leaves open the possibility that
an environmentally questionable diversion within Canada
might be approved, while a more benign diversion to the
United States would be rejected. One can understand the nationalist appeal of such a provision, but it can hardly be characterized as environmentally motivated at heart, no matter
how much environmental rhetoric surrounds the provision.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Canada-U.S. dispute over softwood lumber and the
debate within Canada over the implications of free trade for
water exports are only two examples of environmental issues
becoming intermingled with issues of trade policy. Other examples exist and will continue to emerge. For example, the
question of environmental sovereignty has arisen in the fisheries sector, where both the United States (for lobsters) and
Canada (for herring and salmon) have arguably used nominally conservationist measures to protect segments of their
domestic industries; these measures have led to dispute resolution under both GATT and FTA. Neither the new GATT
agreement nor NAFTA have resolved the underlying disagreements that give rise to such disputes. There will inevitably be pressures on governments to play the environmental
28. Water Transfer Control Act 1989, S.O. § 6(2) (1989). This section ex-

pressly provides so, despite the conclusion of the FTA. Similarly, a proposed
federal statute that died on the order paper with the calling of the 1988 federal
election would have essentially prohibited new large interbasin diversions out
of Canada. Bill C-156, Canada Water Preservation Act, 2nd Sess., 33d Parl.,
1986-87-88 (1st Reading, August 25, 1988).
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card in trade disputes, and those pressures will come from
both interested industries and environmental groups. There
will be strong temptations for environmentalists to make
common cause with those who have other interests in the application of trade sanctions. It remains to be seen, however,
whether short-term expediency will justify the long-term consequences of such alliances.

